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This background paper for the World Bank’s World Development Report 2011 discusses 
current financing arrangements for postconflict countries and fragile states, with a focus 
on official development assistance. In recent years a consensus has emerged that in these 
“difficult environments” the core objective is to build effective and legitimate governance 
structures that secure public confidence through provision of personal security, equal 
justice and the rule of law, economic well-being, and essential social services including 
education and health. Yet tensions persist between business-as-usual development 
policies on the one hand and policies responsive to the demands of peacebuilding on the 
other. The preferential allocation of aid to “good performers,” in the name of maximizing 
its payoff in terms of economic growth, militates against aid to fragile and conflict-
affected states. Compelling arguments can be made for assistance to “poor performers” if 
this can help to prevent conflict and build peace, but the difficulties that prompted donors 
to become more selective in aid allocation remain all too real. The move to selectivity 
came in response to evidence that in some contexts aid has perverse effects on economic 
performance. The same dilemma arises when aid is assessed in terms of its impact on 
peace and conflict: sometimes aid helps to prevent conflict and build peace, but 
sometimes it can have the opposite effect. This paper considers how international aid can 
more effectively help to build resilient states and durable peace.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
After more than a decade of experience and research on financing arrangements in 
postconflict countries and fragile states, a consensus has emerged on at least one matter: 
the core objective is to build effective and legitimate governance structures that secure 
public confidence through provision of personal security, equal justice and the rule of 
law, economic well-being, and essential social services including education and health. 
These governance structures are necessary to ensure that countries do not turn, or turn 
back, to violence as a means of negotiating state-societal relations. 
 
Building institutional capacity and providing critical public goods and services in these 
settings requires financial resources. In many cases, these resources initially must come 
in substantial measure from international sources. In the long run, however, external 
resources must be replaced by domestic resources. Therefore, a key task is to build the 
national fiscal capacities and tax base that are necessary for a durable peace.  
 
This understanding represents a shift from earlier years when peace-making, 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding were treated as discrete activities; political, security, and 
development objectives were pursued as if each was independent of the other; and 
conflict prevention was, to put matters bluntly, nobody’s business.  
 
Much remains to be done to translate this new consensus into effective policies, but its 
basic principles are now well-established in the normative frameworks of the United 
Nations,
1 the World Bank,
2 and bilateral donors as distilled in the OECD Principles for 
Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations.
3 
 
While an integrated approach to early recovery and political stabilization is becoming the 
norm, replacing the older notion of a sequential movement – starting with security, and 
moving through humanitarian assistance, infrastructure recovery, and justice and 
reconciliation, to development – critical sectors continue to be underfunded. Too little is 
invested in effective capacity building in recipient countries, and for that matter in 
building relevant capacities within bilateral and multilateral donor agencies themselves. 
Too little is invested in building national fiscal capacities; among other things, too few 
resources are channeled through national budgets and too little attention is paid to 
building civil society capacities to monitor government finances in the interest of 
ensuring transparency and accountability. Too little is invested in employment generation 
and sustainable livelihoods, notably in rural areas. 
 
On top of these substantive weaknesses are institutional ones. The current architecture of 
international finance for aid to postconflict and fragile states militates against the timely, 
                                                 
1 UN S/2009/304 Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict. 
 
2 Zoellick (2009).  
 
3 OECD (2007).  
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predictable and effective delivery of resources. It lacks tracking, monitoring and 
evaluation mechanisms that would be necessary for accountability among donors, 
recipient governments, and their constituents. It is not well-suited to adapt to changing 
circumstances and opportunities. And it lacks the capacity to formulate coherent policies 
to address the regional dimensions of conflicts. 
 
This paper discusses a number of the weaknesses in current financing arrangements for 
postconflict countries and fragile states, with a focus on official development assistance 
(ODA). We argue that tensions persist between business-as-usual development policies 
on the one hand and policies responsive to the demands of peacebuilding on the other. 
The preferential allocation of aid to “good performers,” in the name of maximizing its 
payoff in terms of economic growth, militates against aid to fragile and conflict-affected 
states. If the aim of aid is redefined to include durable peace, the conventional 
performance criteria for aid allocation lose much of their force. Compelling arguments 
can be made for assistance to “poor performers” if this can help to prevent conflict.  
 
Yet the difficulties that initially prompted donors to become more selective in aid 
allocation remain all too real. Experience has shown that aid can exacerbate problems 
rather than solving them. The donor move to selectivity came in response to 
accumulating evidence that in some contexts aid has perverse effects on economic 
performance. The same dilemma arises when aid is assessed in terms of its impact on 
peace and conflict: sometimes aid helps to prevent conflict and build peace, but 
sometimes it has the opposite effect. In responding to this dilemma, simply retreating 
from intractable problems in difficult settings does not offer a solution. The challenge is 
to devise policies that make the problems more tractable.  
 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
The OECD’s Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States & 
Situations define states as fragile when “state structures lack political will and/or capacity 
to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to 
safeguard the security and human rights of their populations” (OECD 2007, p. 2). This 
formulation suggests that states may have the capacity to provide these basic functions 
but lack political will to do so; that they may have political will but lack capacity; or that 
they may lack both.
4 A subsequent OECD/DAC discussion paper adds a third dimension 
                                                 
4 The dual criteria of will and capacity are adopted by other authors, as well. For example, in proposing an 
“index for state weakness,” Rice and Patrick (2008, p. 3) define “weak states” as lacking “the essential 
capacity and/or will to fulfill four sets of critical government responsibilities: fostering an environment 
conducive to sustainable and equitable economic growth; establishing and maintaining legitimate, 
transparent, and accountable political institutions, securing their populations from violent conflict and 
controlling their territory, and meeting the basic human needs of their population.” Similarly, in a working 
paper for the UK Department for International Development, Moreno Torres and Anderson (2004, p. 12) 
similarly refer to both political will and capacity in defining “difficult environments” as settings where “the 
state is unable or unwilling to harness domestic and international resources effectively for poverty 
reduction.”   
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to the definition: legitimacy, or the ability of the state to meet its population’s 
expectations (OECD 2008, p. 16).
5   
 
Postconflict states are often fragile, and fragile states are often at risk of violent conflict. 
But the risk is especially high in postconflict settings. Describing this “conflict trap,” 
Collier et al. (2003, p. 107) concluded that the risk of conflict is five times greater in 
postconflict countries than in the “typical marginalized country that has not had a war for 
10 years.” Peace agreements can turn out to be little more than ceasefires. 
 
Public finance in the state-society contract 
 
The term “statebuilding” is used in the literature to describe efforts to move from fragility 
to a situation where states have the political will and capacity to provide the basic 
functions to advance the economic well-being and safeguard the physical security of their 
populations, thereby gaining legitimacy and reducing the risk of violent conflict. 
“Peacebuilding” – the construction of a durable peace based in many cases in formal 
peace accords – is statebuilding in settings where the task is complicated and jeopardized 
by the legacy of conflict (Call and Wyeth 2008).  
 
The twin goals of building resilient states and durable peace are increasingly understood 
to hinge on the relationship between states and their citizens. A robust relationship is 
sometimes termed the “state-society contract.” This understanding represents a break 
from state-centric formulations that focus on capacity alone, as reflected, for example, in 
the following statement: “The question of whether security will be provided in a way that 
meets the needs of citizens, or will function primarily as an instrument of oppression, will 
not be dictated by capacity, but shaped – indeed, often usefully constrained – by the basic 
political process of state-society contract formation and reformation” (OECD 2008, p. 8). 
 
Public finance – domestic revenue mobilization, budget allocation, and expenditure 
management – is the circulatory system of the state-society contract. Recent literature on 
peacebuilding and statebuilding has begun to make the public-finance connection (see, 
for example, Boyce and O’Donnell 2007; Brautigam, Fjeldstad and Moore 2008; FIAS 
2009), but its intellectual pedigree is long and deep. The OECD’s fragility triad – 
capacity, will, and legitimacy – mirrors very closely “three reasons to give taxation 
particular attention” enumerated by the historical sociologist Charles Tilly (2009, p. xiii):  
 
First, over the long run it constitutes the largest intervention of governments in 
their subjects’ private life, so much so that the history of state expansion becomes 
                                                 
5 The criterion of legitimacy has also been invoked by other authors. For example, Rotberg (2004, p. 1) 
writes: “Nation-states fail when they are consumed by internal violence and cease delivering positive 
political goods to their inhabitants. Their governments lose credibility, and the continuing nature of the 
particular nation-state itself becomes questionable and illegitimate in the hearts and minds of its citizens.” 
In a similar vein, Ghani and Lockhart (2008, p. 126) write that “citizens provide the ultimate source of 
legitimacy for a social order,” and Picciotto (2008, p. 9) characterizes fragility as a situation in which “the 
society is fractured, the economy is mismanaged and social service delivery is so weak that the social 
contract between the state and the people has been undermined or has broken down altogether.”  
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a history of violent struggle over taxes, and the history of state consolidation 
becomes a history of tax evasion by those who have the guile and power to 
frustrate the fisc. Second, follow the money: the circulation of resources from 
subjects to government-initiated activities provides a sort of CT scan for a 
regime’s entire operation. Third, it dramatizes the problem of consent. 
 
International financing can impact all three dimensions of fragility – capacity, will, and 
legitimacy – for better or for worse. The OECD’s Principles for Good International 
Engagement in Fragile States & Situations recognizes, in its preamble, that “international 
actors can affect outcomes in fragile states in both positive and negative ways” (OECD 
2007, p. 1). In other words, it is not only the quantity of international assistance to fragile 
states and postconflict countries that matters, but also the qualities that determine the sign 




Very substantial international financial resources – and human resources – are now 
devoted to postconflict peacebuilding operations. To cite one indicator, UN troop levels 
rose by 600% from 2002 to 2008 (OECD 2008, p. 28). Direct international provision of 
security in postconflict states now engages more than 170,000 troops, a phenomenon that 
has been described as “a massive shift in global governance arrangements” (OECD 2008, 
p. 28). Official development assistance, the focus of this paper, is an important part of 
this international engagement. 
 
Some literature has pointed to a pronounced disparity, however, between the generous 
international resources directed to postconflict states and the relatively few resources 
directed to other fragile states that are merely at risk of violent conflict. Analyzing aid 
flows to “difficult partnership countries,” an earlier euphemism for fragile states, Levin 
and Dollar (2005) estimated that these countries received 58% less bilateral aid and 34% 
less multilateral aid than their non-fragile counterparts, when controlling for differences 
in population, per capita income, and CPIA (World Bank Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment) scores; without controlling for CPIA scores the difference would be greater. 
Yet within this group, postconflict countries were an exception, receiving more aid per 
capita than the average for low-income countries as a whole, a finding the authors rather 
disarmingly characterize as supporting the “hypothesis that donors increasingly pay 
attention to post-conflict opportunities” (ibid., pp. 14-15). 
 
This disparity between the international financing devoted to postconflict and other 
fragile states is poignantly captured in the words of an ambassador from a fragile but not 
postconflict state: “Why do we have to wait until we have a war to get help with the 
transformation of our justice system or our military?”
6 
 
These generalizations conceal significant differences, however, within the postconflict 
and non-postconflict subsets of fragile states. The OECD Principles conclude with the 
                                                 
6 Quoted in OECD (2008, p. 27).  
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admonition to donors to “avoid pockets of exclusion,” citing the problem of “aid 
orphans,” states (as well as sectors and groups within societies) where aid volumes 
remain low even in the absence of significant political barriers to engagement (OECD 
2007, p. 3). Noting the disparities between “darlings” and “orphans,” Levin and Dollar 
(2005, pp. 18, 25) observe that aid orphans are concentrated in Africa, particularly 
francophone Africa, and that their per capita aid flows are not only lower but also more 
volatile. These disparities cannot be explained by differences in needs; instead the 
explanation must be sought in the various motives of aid donors – which include 
geopolitical considerations and commercial interests in addition to humanitarian, 
developmental, and peacebuilding/statebuilding goals – and to the “strategic dilemmas” 
that arise when these objectives are mutually contradictory (Paris and Sisk 2007; OECD 
2010a). 
 
Apart from these inter-country allocation issues, concerns have been raised in the 
literature about the timing of aid disbursements in postconflict countries (Forman and 
Patrick 2002). Collier and Hoeffler (2004) observed that aid levels tend to be high in the 
first postconflict years but soon decline, and suggest that this pattern does not match 
absorptive capacity – the country’s ability to translate aid into economic growth – which 
may move in the opposite direction. This argument is echoed in the World Bank 
publication Breaking the Conflict Trap (Collier et al. 2003, pp. 157-159). Kang and 
Meernik (2004) find a similar pattern but suggest that this is responsive to immediate 
postconflict needs. Suhrke and Buckmaster (2005), in contrast, offer evidence that this 
pattern is by no means universal, and point to the importance of distinguishing between 
commitments (when aid is pledged) and disbursements (when the money is actually 
spent). In addition, Suhrke, Villanger and Woodward (2005) dispute the Collier-Hoeffler 
conclusion that aid has significantly stronger impacts on growth in the period four to 
seven years after peace, on the grounds that this finding is sensitive to changes in sample 
selection and econometric specification. 
 
The sectoral allocation of aid within postconflict countries and fragile states has also been 
subject to occasional scrutiny and questions. In an analysis of aid to postwar El Salvador, 
Boyce (1996, pp. 130-135) reported discrepancies between peace implementation 
priorities, as defined by the government and United Nations, and donor priorities: high-
priority peace programs – including the National Civilian Police, the land transfer 
program for ex-combatants, and judicial and democratic institutions – remained under-
funded, while donors directed more resources to lower-priority needs such as physical 
infrastructure. A recent OECD study of statebuilding assistance in six case-study 
countries observes that agriculture has received a small percentage of bilateral assistance, 
decreasing over time, despite the crucial role of this sector in livelihoods and economic 
growth (OECD 2010a, pp. 109-110). 
 
Resolving allocation issues and achieving policy coherence in international financing is 
made difficult by lack of coordination among dozens of donor agencies, despite 
widespread recognition of its importance (Forman, Patrick and Salomons 2000). The 
1997 OECD/DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation called 
upon donors to “attempt to formulate and agree on a common integrated strategic 
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framework” that would “provide a guide for prioritising resource allocations across 
sectors and geographical areas, determining the division of labour amongst actors, and 
defining common approaches towards key policy issues” (OECD 1997, pp. 20-22). To 
say that this is easier said than done would be an understatement. The latest effort to 
tackle this problem is the “integrated peacebuilding strategy” process initiated by the UN 
Peacebuilding Support Office with support from the World Bank. 
 
In the meantime, multi-donor trust funds (MDTFs) have emerged as one way to address 
the coordination problem (Schiavo-Campo 2003; Leader and Colenso 2005), but they 
represent only a small share of total aid flows. Some individual donor governments have 
experimented with “whole-of-government” approaches in an effort to resolve 
coordination problems among their own agencies. Apart from the attendant risk that the 
bureaucratic balance-of-power within donor governments will elevate short-term security 
priorities above long-term statebuilding, these efforts carry the risks that they will further 
impede coordination among donors and efforts of recipient governments to forge their 




The literature on the impact of international financing on domestic revenues in 
developing countries in general, and in fragile states in particular, has two main prongs. 
One examines whether aid “crowds out” or “crowds in” domestic revenues. Findings 
have been mixed (see Section 6 below), suggesting that outcomes are conditional on 
context and perhaps policy choices.  
 
The second prong asks whether the tax policy prescriptions of the donors – a centerpiece 
of which has been a shift from tariffs to VAT – have had desirable effects. Baunsgaard 
and Keen (2005) find that trade tax reductions have had a significant negative effect on 
total revenue in low-income countries, with growth in other revenues making up only 
30% of the resulting losses. In fragile states, where the tax/GDP ratio is often lower than 
in other low-income countries, and expenditure needs (particularly in postconflict 
countries) are often higher, the mismatch between revenue needs and tax policy 
prescriptions has been especially striking (for discussion, see Boyce 2002, Di John 2006, 
Boyce and O’Donnell 2007, and Fjeldstad and Moore 2008). 
 
In countries with substantial revenues from extractive resources, such as petroleum and 
minerals, a related set of issues arises: how to ensure that these revenues do not 
undermine the state-society relationship by freeing the state from the need to enter into 
the fiscal compact that ties taxation to its delivery of public goods and services. By 
weakening capacities in “rentier states,” resource rents can contribute to state fragility 
(Karl 1997, Fearon and Laitin 2003). The examples of Botswana and Malaysia, countries 
where resource rents have supported state capacities rather than undermining them, 
suggest that this outcome is not inevitable (FIAS 2009). As Di John (2008, p. 22) 
remarks, “factor endowments do not determine politics.”  
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On the expenditure side of national fiscal capacity, the literature again cautions that 
international assistance can have crowding-out effects. Aid to fragile states and 
postconflict countries generally bypasses the government budget to a greater extent than 
aid to “good performers” (Leader and Colenso 2005, pp. 11-15; OECD 2009b, Table 
A.9). Apart from the opportunity cost of foregone development of state capacities to 
allocate resources and manage expenditures, the resulting “dual public sector” – one 
national, the other international – may diminish state capacities below what they would 
have been in the absence of aid, as human resources are siphoned off by international 
agencies and government administrative time is diverted into coping with the attendant 
coordination problems (Ghani et al. 2007; Birdsall 2007; Boyce 2008; OECD 2010a). 
“The largest adverse impact of the aid system,” in the view of Ghani and Lockhart (2008, 
p. 100), “has been the undermining of a country’s budget as the central instrument of 
policy.” 
 
Recommended policies to address this problem are context-specific. Where fragility takes 
the form of adequate political will but inadequate capacity, increasing the share of aid 
that is channeled through the budget, with technical assistance and “dual control” systems 
to minimize leakage and corruption, is seen as desirable (see, for example, Leader and 
Colenso 2005, pp. 22-23; Boyce and O’Donnell 2007, pp. 287-289; OECD 2008, pp. 40-
41). Where the state lacks the political will to advance the economic well-being and 
protect the physical security of the population, efforts to work “around the state” have 
more appeal, although as Leader and Colenso (2005, p. 51) observe, “governments in 
fragile states are rarely homogeneous, and reformers and pro-poor constituencies will 
exist both within and without the state,” creating possible openings for mixed strategies. 
 
Galtung and Tisné (2009) emphasize the potential role of “social-accountability 
mechanisms” whereby communities and citizen-based groups provide “monitoring from 
below,” noting that this has been successful in a number of developing countries albeit 
seldom in countries recovering from war. An example is the Poverty Action Fund 
established in Uganda in 1998, in which 5% of the fund is devoted to monitoring by civil 
society organizations (Krafchik 2001; Ndikumana and Nannyonjo 2007). Such initiatives 
could be facilitated by greater transparency on the part of aid donors themselves, an 




Insofar as international financing stimulates local economic activity, this may indirectly 
advance the fiscal dimension of statebuilding by expanding the country’s tax base. Local 
procurement of goods and services, as opposed to external procurement, serves this goal. 
This opportunity is often neglected by donors, however, as illustrated in a study on the 
economic impact of peacekeeping operations in eight countries by Carnahan, Durch and 
Gilmore (2006). Durch (2009) reports that local content on average represented only 6% 
of peacekeeping mission procurement in the years 2004-2008; he concludes that for 
peacekeepers, their contribution to the host economy “is largely incidental to doing their 
                                                 
7 For a discussion of tensions between “bottom-up” and “top-down” approaches to the measurement of 
government performance, see Radin (2007). 
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main job, yet what is incidental to them may be critical to those whose goods and 
services may be utilized by these sometimes-large civil-military operations” (ibid., p. 15).  
 
Finally, the ability of the state to fulfill the service delivery side of the state-society fiscal 
contract is affected by the extent to which tax revenue must be devoted instead to 
external debt service, a legacy of past international financing (Alvarez-Plata and Brück 
2007). These debts – sometimes repackaged as new “emergency credits”
8 – drain scarce 
resources away from the needs of the population. If the original loans provided 
commensurate benefits to the country’s people, this could be argued to justify the cost. 
But there is econometric as well as case-study evidence that a substantial fraction of past 




3. Trends in International Financing 
 
This section reviews trends in international assistance to postconflict and fragile 
countries.
10 First we discuss the magnitude and timing of postconflict aid; then we 
discuss the allocation of aid between postconflict countries and fragile yet non-
postconflict countries; finally we discuss sectoral priorities in the allocation of aid. 
 
Postconflict aid: Magnitudes and timing 
 
Postconflict states account for a substantial percentage of official development assistance 
(ODA) worldwide. Trends in their share of total aid disbursements since the end of the 
cold war in 1989 are shown in Figure 1, based on two alternative definitions of what 
constitutes a postconflict country: (i) “formal peace,” defined as the period up to 10 years 
after the signing of a peace accord, as long as conflict does not resume; and (ii) “negative 
peace,” defined as the period up to 10 years after battle-deaths fall below the level of 
1,000/year, regardless of whether or not this was accompanied by a peace accord, again 
as long as conflict does not resume.
11 Although the percentages have declined in the last 
five years, postconflict countries by the formal-peace definition continue to receive 
almost 10% of total ODA; by the negative peace definition their share exceeds 15%.  
 
 
                                                 
8 For example, the IMF’s emergency credit window for postconflict countries has provided loans to repay 
bridge loans that in turn were used to clear previous IMF arrears (Boyce 2002, p. 67). 
9 For a case study of the DRC, see Ndikumana and Boyce (1998); for an econometric analysis of the 
relationship between external borrowing and capital flight in sub-Saharan Africa, see Ndikumana and 
Boyce (2010). 
 
10 In this paper our focus is official development assistance (ODA). For discussion of other important 
elements of the external resource envelope in post-conflict settings, including peacekeeping expenditures 
and humanitarian assistance, see OECD (2010b). 
11 For this purpose, resumption of conflict is defined as at least 1,000 battle-related deaths/year, as 



































There are large differences among recipient countries in the amount of aid received. 
Figure 2 illustrates this by comparing annual aid per capita (in constant 2007 dollars) 
during the first five postconflict years across six countries. Bosnia and Herzegovina tops 
the list by a wide margin, receiving almost $350/person/year. The other five countries – 
all in sub-Saharan Africa or Central America – received less than $100/person/year, with 
aid to Guatemala being the lowest at barely $30 per capita. These disparities almost 
certainly reflect the geopolitical priorities of the donor countries more than differences in 




























































As noted above, some authors have argued that the timing of postconflict aid is poorly 
aligned with the “absorptive capacity” of recipients, at least if by the latter we mean 
opportunities to maximize positive impacts on economic growth: it is argued that aid 
peaks in the immediate postconflict years and subsequently declines, whereas growth 
impacts are greatest in the middle years of the postconflict decade. The trends depicted in 
Figure 3 for the same six countries suggest that this picture is not easily generalizable: 
significant “front-loading” of aid occurred only in Bosnia and Herzegovina, whereas in 
the other five countries aid was disbursed at a relatively constant level over the 
postconflict decade. Moreover, objectives other than economic growth underpin the 


































































Source: Calculated from OECD-DAC database. 
 
Speed of disbursement is widely regarded as a critical factor in postconflict and fragile 
state situations where actual and perceived progress is essential to confidence-building. 
Yet the international financing toolbox remains sluggish, sequential and unintegrated. 
The case of southern Sudan is illustrative. Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) 
was signed in January 2005. A multi-donor trust fund in support of building domestic 
institutions in south Sudan was established in August 2005, but by January 2006 – a full 
year after the signing of the CPA – no significant spending from the MDTF had occurred. 
Limited spending began only in March 2006. Disbursements ran into a Catch-22 
stumbling block: World Bank administrators of the trust fund could not disburse without 
south Sudanese officials themselves setting priorities and approving expenditures, but 
“the government officials in question had next to no human resources, and the purpose of 
the MTDF was precisely to help build that capacity” (Chandran et al. 2008, p. 20). 
 
Comparison between aid to postconflict and other fragile states 
 
Compared to the international resources provided to postconflict countries – which are 
substantial, albeit uneven across countries and in some cases over time – the resources 
provided to “fragile” states at risk of conflict (but not postconflict) are far more modest. 
Indeed, states that are not “postconflict” but are nevertheless classified as “fragile” by the 
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World Bank receive less aid per capita than non-fragile states. Figure 4 depicts average 
aid per capita in 2007 for three subsets of low-income sub-Saharan African countries: 
non-fragile, fragile (but not post conflict), and postconflict (by the formal peace 
definition). Fragile countries receive only 65% as much aid per capita as non-fragile 






















Source: Net ODA disbursements from OECD-DAC database;  




Figure 5 shows per capita aid disbursements in the six low-income West African 
countries classified as “postconflict” (Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, and Liberia) and 
“fragile” but not postconflict (Togo, Guinea, and the Gambia) in 2007. Controlling for 











Aid to low-income West African countries, 2007: 

















Figure 6 depicts per capita aid trends over the period 1993-2007, again for low-income 
sub-Saharan African countries. Here we can observe not only that postconflict countries 
consistently received more aid than fragile countries, but also that the disparity between 
the latter and other (non-fragile and non-postconflict) countries has widened over time. 
This trend coincides with a shift in donor policies towards greater “selectivity” (also 
known as “ex post conditionality”) in inter-country aid allocation, and away from 
traditional (“ex ante”) conditionality, in an effort to foster “country ownership” and 










                                                 
































































Source: Net ODA disbursements from OECD-DAC database;  




Two observations can be made based on these comparisons. First, selectivity in aid 
allocation across countries, so as to favor “good performers” with “good policies,” may 
contribute systematically to lower aid to fragile countries than to non-fragile countries. 
Donors face a dilemma: preferentially allocating aid to those countries where it is likely 
to have the strongest pro-growth impacts (at least, in the short run) means providing less 
to those countries classified as “fragile states.” Second, if and when the latter “at-risk” 
countries descend into violent conflict, much greater resources ultimately are provided as 
postconflict aid. Together, these observations suggest that it would be more cost-effective 
to allocate more resources to fragile states before the onset of violent conflict.  
 
This conclusion rests, however, on the less-than-certain premise that additional 
international assistance would reduce rather than increase the likelihood of conflict; in 
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other words, the assumption that aid to fragile states would support conflict prevention. It 
would be naïve to assume that this happy result necessarily holds. On the contrary, 
inappropriate aid can foster polarization and generate conflict.
13 As an OECD report on 
“Resource Flows to Fragile and Conflict-Affected States” observes, both natural 
resources and ODA are “particularly easy targets” for corrupt (loot-seeking) behavior 
(OECD 2009a, p. 96, emphasis added). Corruption, in turn, may feed, and feed upon 
weak governance and insecurity, combining in what Zoellick (2008) describes as a 
“downward spiral.”  
 
Yet the same caveat applies to postconflict countries: here, too, aid may have perverse 
effects, exacerbating the likelihood of renewed conflict and becoming a target for 
corruption. Indeed there is no reason to assume that these risks are greater in fragile states 
without a recent history of violent conflict than in postconflict countries. Hence the 
relatively low per capita aid provided to fragile states can be viewed as a symptom of 
resource misallocation by the international community. This said, the case for more aid to 
“at-risk” countries would be greatly strengthened by the development and use of 
analytical tools for ex ante conflict impact assessment and ex post evaluation of aid’s 
effectiveness as an instrument for conflict prevention.
14  
 
Apart from the level of aid per capita, the volatility of aid flows may be important since 
greater volatility can exacerbate uncertainties and make budget and planning decisions 
more difficult.
15 Table 1 presents data on aid volatility, as measured by the coefficient of 
variation of annual ODA disbursements, in sub-Saharan African countries in the period 
1989-2007. On average, aid flows to postconflict countries and fragile states are more 
volatile than flows to countries that are neither fragile nor postconflict. There are 
substantial differences among countries within each group, however, making 
generalization difficult. For example, if Nigeria and Republic of Congo were omitted 
from the “fragile, not postconflict” group, the average volatility among the remaining 
countries would be about the same as that in the “not fragile, not postconflict” group. 
Moreover, in some cases the greater volatility in the postconflict group can be explained, 
at least in part, by disruptions attributable to conflict itself. These observations suggest 
that greater aid volatility may be a country-specific issue rather than a general correlate of 









                                                 
13 For discussion, see Boyce (2002), Flores and Nooruddin (2009), and Hartzell and Hoddie (2010). 
14 For discussion, see Hoeffler and Billerbeck (2010). 




Table 1: Aid Volatility 






























































Postconflict: The country is classified as postconflict (by the formal peace definition) at some 
time during the period. 
Fragile: The country is classified as fragile for three or more years during the period. 
 
Sources: 
Postconflict and fragile status from World Bank data files. ODA volatility calculated from 





The sectoral allocation of international assistance may be just as important as its overall 
magnitude and timing. The sectoral distribution of aid to fragile and postconflict 
countries differs from that of aid to other countries (see Figure 7). A lower fraction of aid 
is spent on infrastructure, although this remains the single largest category of assistance, 
accounting for more than 30% of total aid in both fragile and postconflict countries. 
Higher fractions are spent on governance aid and humanitarian relief. These differences 
are not surprising, and are consistent with reallocation in response to needs specific to 







Source: OECD-DAC database. 
 
 
This is not to say, however, that sectoral allocations are optimal. While inter-country 
differences in needs and aid allocations (as well as lack of finely disaggregated data) 
make generalizations difficult, there is evidence of a widespread tendency toward 
underinvestment in the agricultural sector. Table 2 presents data on the agricultural share 
of ODA in low-income sub-Saharan African countries. Overall, agriculture receives a 
small share of aid relative to its share of the labor force: it receives more than 10% of aid 
in only six of the 26 countries, while accounting on average for roughly three-quarters of  
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the labor force. Of course, some fraction of other sorts of aid (such as transportation, 
health and education) goes to rural areas, too, mitigating the apparent bias against rural 
areas if not offsetting it entirely.  
 
What is striking in these data, however, is that the share of aid directed to agriculture in 
fragile and postconflict countries tends to be lower than in non-fragile countries. Insofar 
as this is correlated with a lower rural share of non-agricultural aid (for roads, schools, 
health clinics, etc.), this suggests that the rural population receives a lower percentage of 
aid in these countries despite the importance of inclusive economic development for 
conflict prevention and postconflict peacebuilding. Even if we acknowledge the existence 
of many other pressing needs, it is hard to avoid concluding that something is amiss in 
Burundi and Guinea-Bissau, for example, where agriculture’s share of the labor force is 
more than 90% and yet agriculture receives barely 1% of ODA.
16 
 
To provide some idea of the extent to which aid directly supports statebuilding, Table 3 
presents data on the share of ODA allocated to governance and budget support in sub-
Saharan African countries. “Governance” here is broadly measured as the sum of two 
categories in the OECD Creditor Reporting System database: “government and civil 
society” and “other social infrastructure and services.”
17 Budget support refers to money 
that is routed through government budgets, which can strengthen state capacities to 
allocate resources and manage expenditure. As might be expected, a somewhat larger 
fraction of aid is allocated to governance in fragile and postconflict countries (12.2% and 
16.3%, respectively) than in non-fragile countries (10.3%). The reverse is true in the case 
of budget support, however: the average share is only 1.9% in fragile countries and 6.1% 
in postconflict countries, compared to 7.9% in non-fragile countries. Put differently, 98% 
of the aid to fragile countries in sub-Saharan Africa bypasses the government budget. 
 
The share of aid allocated for support of the rule of law – an element of “good 
governance” that is often a critical weakness in fragile states and postconflict countries – 
generally is even smaller than the share for agriculture. Table 4 presents data on ODA 
disbursements in sub-Saharan Africa in the two sub-sectors in the OECD Creditor 
Reporting System database that correspond most closely to rule-of-law: “legal and 
judicial development” and “human rights.” Although there is some evidence of 
responsiveness to the need for greater attention to this sector in fragile and postconflict 
countries – the share of ODA in these groups averaged 1.0% and 1.5%, respectively, as 
opposed to 0.7% in non-fragile countries – the most striking feature of these data is the 
small fraction of aid devoted to this sector.
18  
                                                 
16 The OECD (2010a, pp. 109-110) similarly suggests that in recent years donors have accorded insufficient 
priority to the agricultural sector in fragile and postconflict countries. 
17 In the OECD classification scheme, the latter category includes not only aid for purposes closely related 
to statebuilding, such as “statistical capacity building” and “employment policy and administration 
management,” but also aid for less closely related purposes, such as low-cost housing, narcotics control, 
and “social mitigation of HIV/AIDS.” It would be useful if more precise classifications of governance-
related assistance could be introduced in the OECD database. 
18 There is no obvious benchmark for ascertaining the “right” amount of aid that ought to be allocated to 
support for the rule of law (or, for that matter, to other sectors). The percentages of ODA reported in Table 
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Table 2: Agricultural share of labor force and ODA in low-income sub-Saharn 
African countries, 2005 
Country  Agriculture share of labor 
force (%) 
Agriculture share 
of ODA (%) 
Non-fragile countries 
Mauritania 57.1  31.8 
Malawi  89.4  14.7 
Kenya 77.3  13.3 
ina Faso  92.1  12.1  Burk
Mozambique 86.5  6.5 
Tanzania  82.6  6.4 
Senegal 81  4.5 
ia  74.5  4.2  Zamb
Madagascar 76.1  2.9 
Benin  60  2.6 
Ethiopia 78.8  2.4 
Uganda  84.6  2.2 
Ghana 65  1.9 
  Non-fragile average  77.3  8.1 
Fragile (but not postconflict) countries 
Gambia  88.9  15.1 
Zimbabwe 71.5  1.2 
ea  86.1  2.1  Guin
Eritrea 88.4  2.1 
61.1  1.4  Togo 
Chad 75.8  0.9 
  Fragile average  78.6  3.8 
Postconflict countries    
Central African Rep.  68  10.8 
Sierra Leone  64.5  5.4 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  65.5  1.2 
Burundi 92.3  1.2 
lia  80.1  1.1  Soma
Guinea-Bissau 90.9  1.1 
Liberia  60.6  0.2 
  Postconflict average  74.6  3.0 
Source: Calculated from WDI and OECD Creditor Reporting System databases. 
                                                                                                                                                 
3 are similar to the share of judicial and legal system expenditures in total government spending within the 
donor countries themselves: in 2006-07 these amounted for example to 0.7% in the U.K.; 0.9% in France; 
and 1.0% in the U.S. (calculated from data from the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice and 




Table 3:  
ODA disbursements for governance and budget support in sub-Saharan African 
countries  
(annual average 2006-2008) 
 
Country  Governance 
($ million) 
Governance 




(% of ODA) 
Non-fragile countries 
Benin 65.2  10.66  57.6  9.83 
Botswana  8  4.89  0  0 
Burkina Faso  89.3  8.16  152.1  14.35 
Cape Verde  25.1  13.79  12.8  6.64 
Ethiopia 335.8  10.98  0.2  0 
Gabon  8.9  10.11  0.3  0.43 
Ghana 141.6  9.11  201.2  13.14 
Kenya  127.6  10.07  19.7  1.46 
Lesotho 23.9  20.28  1  1.12 
Madagascar  100  9.43  63  6.26 
Malawi 97.4  7.38  92.9  7.4 
Mali  119.1  9.96  91.9  6.94 
Mauritania 40  10.16  10.5  2.95 
Mauritius  7.1  6.7  71.1  51.19 
Mozambique  223.2  11.09  339.6  16.82 
Namibia  22  11.59  0  0 
Niger  59.4  8.8  44.6  6.55 
Senegal  97.6  8.56  28.8  2.78 
South Africa  183.6  19.87  0.1  0.01 
Swaziland  4.4  8.62  0  0 
Tanzania  285.2  9.53  472.4  15.89 
Uganda  199.3  9.34  136.2  5.33 
Zambia  100  7.94  150.3  12.02 
Non-fragile average  102.8  10.31  84.6  7.87 
Fragile (but not postconflict) countries 
Cameroon  53.7  3.29  141.5  9.11 
Chad  25.8  6.56  8.7  2.82 
Congo, Rep.  15.4  5.16  19.1  4.75 
Equatorial Guinea  5.3  15.87  0.1  0.25 
Eritrea  15.9  11.65  0  0 
Gambia, The  13.5  15.55  0  0 
Guinea  37  12.7  0  0 
Nigeria  201.4  7.8  8.8  0.45 
Sao Tome and Principe  8.8  15.11  0.1  0.12 
Togo  50.4  26.15  8.2  3.48 
Zimbabwe  61  14.48  0.1  0.03 
Fragile average  44.4  12.21  17.0  1.91 
Postconflict Countries 
Angola  70.3  21.21  3.5  1.03 
Burundi  57.4  12.42  42.9  9.14 
Central African Republic  38.7  19.29  13.2  6.72 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  230.2  13.03  2.1  0.11 
Cote d'Ivoire  78  13.64  17.6  5.24 
Guinea-Bissau  17.1  13.54  11.8  9.66 
Liberia  155.6  21.76  3.1  0.46 
Rwanda  110.1  11.88  112.1  12.54 
Sierra Leone  87.8  20.24  43.9  9.81 
Postconflict average  93.9  16.33  27.8  6.08 
 
Source: Calculated from WDI and OECD Creditor Reporting System databases. http://bit.ly/cps66x 
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Table 4: ODA disbursements for rule of law in sub-Saharan African countries  
(annual average 2006-2008) 
 
Country  ODA for rule of law 
($ millions) 
Rule of law 
share of ODA 
(%) 
Non-fragile countries 
Benin 9  1.58 
Botswana  0.5  0.47 
Burkina Faso  7.7  0.74 
Cape Verde  1.1  0.68 
Ethiopia 13.5  0.43 
Gabon  0.1  0.15 
Ghana 4.4  0.31 
Kenya  21.1  1.68 
Lesotho 1.7  1.69 
Madagascar  4.3  0.44 
Malawi 8.9  0.65 
Mali  2.5  0.22 
Mauritania 0.8  0.23 
Mauritius  0.2  0.21 
Mozambique 16  0.8 
Namibia  1.5  0.81 
Niger  3.1  0.5 
Senegal  3.2  0.21 
South Africa  14  1.61 
Swaziland  0.3  0.61 
Tanzania  11.7  0.41 
Uganda  30.4  1.59 
Zambia  5.5  0.42 
  Non-fragile average  7.02  0.71 
Fragile (but not postconflict) countries 
Cameroon  3.4  0.17 
Chad 1.4  0.38 
Congo, Rep.  0.6  0.25 
Equatorial Guinea  1.3  3.75 
Eritrea  1  0.72 
Gambia  0.7  0.88 
Guinea  0.6  0.17 
Nigeria 18.9  0.89 
Sao Tome & Principe  0.1  0.21 
Togo 1.3  0.88 
Zimbabwe  11.9  2.88 
  Fragile average  3.7  1.02 
Postconflict countries    
Angola  4.2  1.31 
Burundi  4.9  1.04 
Central African Rep.  2  1.01 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  23.5  1.37 
Cote d'Ivoire  1.8  0.42 
Guinea-Bissau  1.9  1.55 
Liberia  2.8  0.36 
Rwanda  22.9  2.49 
Sierra Leone  16.9  3.76 
  Postconflict average  9.0  1.48 
 





Money is not the only metric for assessing donor priorities or their goodness-of-fit with 
recipient needs, however, nor is it necessarily the most important. A recent review of 
donor-supported justice-strengthening programs concluded that “absolute expenditures 
are often not a good measure of significance,” because “some activities simply cost more 
than others, and some of the most important ones may cost donors very little as they 
ultimately hinge on cooperating countries’ willingness to change policies” (Hammergren 
2008, p. 13). Since inadequate donor support for justice and the rule of law is often cited 
as a problem, it is worth quoting the review at some length: 
 
The problem arises when donors finance things (buildings and equipment in 
Guatemala or the rest of Central America for that matter) the government could 
easily fund, engage in piloting activities unlikely to be replicated (Cambodia’s 
model court), duplicate each others’ efforts, or fund activities likely to disappear 
once they leave the scene. This is where the imbalances occur – less between what 
is promised and what is financed, but as part of a more rational consideration of 
what makes the most sense…. If an activity does not support something that would 
not otherwise be done; if it does not leverage more change; and if it is redundant 
or not sustainable, perhaps it should not be funded. (Ibid., p. 14). 
 
In other words, there is scope for improving the inter-sectoral allocation of aid in terms 
not only of “how much” but also “what” – that is, in terms of how the allocated funds are 
spent. In particular, we argue below that too little is invested in building national fiscal 
capacities to sustain the ability of the state to mobilize revenue and deliver public goods 
and services, and that too little attention is paid to building civil society capacities to 
monitor government finances in the interest of ensuring transparency and accountability. 
Such lacunae in the qualities of aid can be as important – indeed, sometimes more 
important – than shortfalls in the quantity of aid. 
 
4. Modalities of International Financing 
 
There are multiple channels and modalities by which bilateral and multilateral financing 
is provided to postconflict countries and fragile states. These include grants and loans 
directly provided by donors to recipient governments, global thematic trust funds, 
country-specific trust funds, and debt relief. 
 
Disbursements of ODA by individual donors in 2007, and the percentages of their 
resources that went to postconflict countries (here defined by the “negative peace” 
criterion) and to fragile states are reported in Table 5.
19 These data indicate that top 
donors to postconflict countries were the United States, the European Community, IDA, 
and the United Kingdom, together accounting for more than half of the total. Among 
these donors, the UK devoted the largest fraction (37.6%) of its disbursements to the 
negative-peace countries. Overall, postconflict countries received 17% of ODA and 
fragile states received 25%. 
                                                 
19 “Fragile states” as defined in the World Bank’s fragile states list, on which a given country’s 
classification can vary over time. 
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countries  ($ 
million) 
Percentage 
total ODA to 
fragile 
countries 
United States  13698  2222  16.2  3733  27.2 
EC  9018 2186  24.2  2135  23.7 
IDA  7450  1479  19.9  1653  22.2 
United Kingdom  3545 1335  37.6  1116  31.5 
Japan  4477  684  15.3  849  19.0 
Germany  6391 549  8.6  1559  24.4 
Norway  1750  503  28.7  580  33.2 
France  5206 496  9.5  1234  23.7 
Netherlands  2317  427  18.4  534  23.0 
Belgium  782 333  42.5  390  49.9 
Spain  2197  327  14.9  247  11.2 
Global Fund (GFATM)  1600 295  18.4  374  23.4 
Sweden  1524  285  18.7  520  34.1 
Canada  1995 254  12.8  753  37.8 
Denmark  1257  239  19.0  283  22.5 
AfDF (African Dev. Fund)  1100 230  20.9  105  9.5 
UNICEF  692  196  28.4  262  37.9 
Switzerland  704 186  26.4  230  32.6 
Ireland  613  174  28.4  193  31.5 
Australia  1768 106  6.0  456  25.8 
UNDP  428  101  23.5  164  38.2 
Austria  1178 86  7.3  116  9.9 
Italy  1121  73  6.5  153  13.6 
Arab Countries  538 69  12.9  83  15.4 
Finland  374  67  18.0  130  34.8 
Korea  431 67  15.6  103  24.0 
IFAD  322  67  20.8  98  30.4 
Portugal  229 62  27.2  122  53.4 
Arab Agencies  425  62  14.6  55  12.9 
WFP  230 60  25.8  77  33.3 
UNFPA  214  57  26.5  72  33.6 
UNTA  278 54  19.5  83  29.7 
Greece  174  47  27.0  45  26.0 
UNHCR  114 38  33.2  36  32.0 
Luxembourg  212  34  15.9  38  17.9 
AsDF (Asian Dev. Fund)  1182 33  2.8  313  26.5 
GEF  150  24  16.1  15  10.1 
Slovak Republic  23 19  82.4  19  84.8 
Turkey  522  19  3.7  165  31.6 
MONTREAL PROTOCOL  94 19  19.8  0  0.0 
Czech Republic  61  14  23.7  21  35.0 
New Zealand  164 10  6.0  54  33.1 
Nordic Dev. Fund  68  7  10.6  7  10.8 
Iceland  23 3  13.0  5  21.8 
Hungary  33  1  3.9  8  25.2 
EBRD  6 1  15.3  1  16.7 
CarDB (Caribbean Dev. 
Bank) 
37  0  0.0  0  0.0 
UNRWA  700 0  0.0  0  0.0 
Poland  154  -1  -0.7  12  7.8 
IDB Spec. Fund  206 -15  -7.2  94  45.8 
SAF+ESAF+PRGF(IMF)  -72  -35  48.9  49  -68.8 
Total 77703  13548  17.4  19346  24.9 
Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System database. 
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The multiplicity of financing mechanisms has benefits and costs. On the plus side, they 
permit substantial resource flows, open channels for non-traditional funders, and may 
facilitate assistance in program areas that are critical to postconflict recovery and 
stabilization but are not included among traditional ODA activities. On the minus side, 
the fragmentation of financing among diverse agencies leads to serious planning, 
coordination, and evaluation problems that make it difficult or impossible to ensure that 
financial support gets to where it is most needed in a timely, predictable and effective 
manner. The systematic tracking of financial flows is itself a major challenge yet to be 
met, as illustrated by gaps in coverage in the OECD-DAC database. The many 
distribution channels open multiple pathways for corruption and manipulation of aid 
flows. For recipient governments with limited administrative capacities, the task of 
interacting with multiple donors, each with distinctive procedural and reporting 
requirements, can pose a formidable burden.  
 
In this section we briefly discuss five international financing modalities that, one way or 
another, seek to address the aid fragmentation problem: IDA, the main window through 
which the World Bank channels resources to postconflict and fragile states; multi-donor 
trust funds; “whole-of-government” approaches to bilateral aid, that seek to foster 
coherence among different agencies within the same donor government; regional 
approaches to funding that seek to foster coherence across aid to different countries 
within the same conflict-affected region; and the UN Peacebuilding Fund, established in 





The World Bank’s main window for funding to postconflict and fragile states is IDA. The 
2007 IDA-15 review of “Operational Approaches and Financing in Fragile States” 
reports that IDA allocated SDR 11 billion to fragile states (about 19% of its total 
resources) over the past decade, although in per capita terms IDA flows to non-fragile 
states (excluding capped blend countries, that qualify for a mix of IBRD and IDA 
lending) were 50% higher than to fragile states. The review recommends measures to 
close gaps in IDA’s exceptional financing arrangements, where “exceptional” means 
arrangements that depart from its usual Performance-Based Allocation (PBA) that links 
aid to progress in improving performance indicators. This points to the inherent tension 
between “ex post conditionality” (or “selectivity”), which seeks to allocate aid so as to 
reward good performers, and the needs of postconflict and fragile states where 
performance according to the usual indicators is often weak. 
 
In addition to IDA, the World Bank administers a State and Peacebuilding Fund (SPF) 
that provides support for countries in arrears (to which further lending is barred under 
Bank rules) and for small but urgent activities not easily funded by IDA. The SPF was 
created in 2008, replacing two earlier trust funds – the Post-Conflict Fund and the Low-
Income Countries Under Stress Fund – on the grounds that conflict and fragility are 
closely related. Initial resources came from $100 million in World Bank administrative 
funds plus contributions from the governments of Norway and the Netherlands. 
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Multi-Donor Trust Funds    
 
A diverse set of multi-donor trust funds (MDTFs) have been used to channel resources to 
postconflict countries and fragile states in recent years.  As of 2007, the total funding 
through some eighteen operative MDTFs amounted to $1.2 billion, still a small fraction 
of the international financing for postconflict and fragile states. Over the preceding five 
years, MDTFs aimed at fragile states disbursed $2.6 billion, with the Afghanistan 
Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) accounting for roughly half of this total (IDA 2007, 
p. 37). The resource-pooling achieved by MDTFs is intended to encourage joint 
assessment, planning and program implementation; provide an umbrella for donor 
participation in response to national development plans and priorities; and reduce 
transaction costs, especially for recipient governments with limited administrative 
capacity (UNDP Review of Trust Funds, 2007). 
 
At present, both the World Bank and UNDP-UNDG operate MDTFs. The World Bank’s 
trust funds can provide direct budget support to recipient governments, including 
recurrent costs, whereas UN trust funds must be disbursed through a UN cooperating 
agency, each of which operates under its own rules and procedures.
20  
 
While potentially competitive and/or duplicative, trust funds can complement each other, 
for example by providing direct budget support and sector-specific support. In 
Afghanistan, under the so-called “two window” approach, the Bank-administered ARTF 
has provided budget support, covering anything but humanitarian assistance and law 
enforcement, while the UNDP-administered Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan 
(LOTFA) channeled resources to police salaries and other recurrent costs.
21 The UN 
PBF, the EU African Peace Facility (APF), and the EC Instrument for Stability are also 
able to fund non-ODA eligible activities.  The Bank and the UNDG have engaged in 
efforts to standardize their procedures in order to facilitate their accessibility and use 
(Scanteam 2007; Development Initiatives 2006). The merits and complications of the 
two-window model are now being debated in what could either be defense of turf o
credible assessment of the value of complementary mech
r a 
anisms. 
                                                
 
As the use of MDTFs becomes more popular, it would be useful to have a comparative 
analysis of aggregate and sector financing over time by global, country, and country-




Whole-of-government approaches have been initiated in several OECD donor countries 
in an effort to formulate an integrative approach to security, governance, and 
 
20 See OECD (2008), pp. 55-58, for a detailed review of operational challenges to the MDTFs. 
 
21 In addition, the UNDP-administered Afghan Interim Authority Fund provided initialsupport for the civil 
service and Loya Jirga. 
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development by bringing together defense, foreign, and development ministries. While 
these efforts hold potential for policy coherence and harmonization of procedures and 
regulations, they are still in the testing phase and suffer the usual problems of timely, 
predictable and effective funding. Since they tend not to pool their funds with other 
efforts, they also do not resolve the coordination problems that arise when multiple 
bilateral and multilateral donors operate in recipient countries. Moreover, the whole-of-
government approaches have tended to focus on postconflict states, where defense 
ministries often take a lead role, rather than fragile states where development ministries 
would likely take the lead. Differing doctrinal stances and competition for resources have 





While considerable attention has been paid to the regional dimension of conflicts and the 
importance of engaging neighboring states in processes of conflict mitigation and 
peacekeeping, there have been few concomitant developments in the financial 
architecture or structure of aid flows, and even fewer efforts to evaluate them. One such 
initiative was the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MRDP) for 
the Great Lakes region of Africa, and this experience should be evaluated for its lessons 
on the benefits and difficulties of a regional approach. The UK government’s Africa Pool 
and Global Conflict Prevention Pool contain regional initiatives, but these operate at 
small scale relative to direct country aid programs.  Other initiatives aimed at resolving or 
staving off regional crises, that merit further examination, include: the OECD-sponsored 
Club du Sahel, which provided support and distributional planning for eight countries in 
the region subject to drought and famine; the recommended (but not implemented) 
proactive approach to regional conflict prevention in the Ferghana Valley in Central 
Asia
23;  the India, Nepal, Bangladesh watershed program aimed as preventing water 
resource conflicts in the region; the similarly intentioned Nile River Basin Initiative; and 
the Mano River Basin initiative, which focused on early warning and training in the 
forest area shared by Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.
24 
 
The potential for regional development banks, including the ADB, AfDB, and IDB, to 
play a role in conflict prevention and postconflict reconstruction via cross-border 
initiatives should be examined, as should the potential roles of the African sub-regional 
organizations that were established initially to promote regional economic integration but 
increasingly have become involved in conflict prevention, conflict mitigation and 
postconflict reconstruction. ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID) 
                                                 
22 For discussion, see (Patrick and Browne 2009; CIC, “Recovering from War” 2008; OECD Resource 
Flows, 2008, pp. 52-59). 
 
23 Center for Preventive Action, “Calming the Ferghana Valley: Development and Dialogue in the Heart of 
Central Asia.” New York: Council on Foreign Relations and Century Foundation, 1999. 
24 O’Brien, Graybow and Iacopetta (2000) compiled an inventory of 59 regional intergovernmental 
organizations. The fragmentary nature of the available data is reflected in the fact that this study provides 
total budgets for only 28 of them. We know of no more recent effort to collect this information. 
   27
and the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), affiliated with SADC, may also 
have some potential in this regard.  While not a funding entity itself, the UN’s regional 
office for West Africa (UNOWA) could extend its cross-border functions to advise on 
subregional funding opportunities to advance security and development. 
 
The UN Peacebuilding Fund 
 
The one financing modality established specifically to address early recovery in 
postconflict situations is of recent origin: the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), created in 
2006. It holds promise, but many observers agree that it has failed to utilize the more than 
$300 million raised as of February 2010 in the most effective manner. While exceeding 
its initial funding goal by some $50 million, with contributions from 45 donor countries, 
more than two-thirds of the PBF’s finances come from its five lead donors, making it 
highly dependent on the preferences of donors who are able to “forum shop” among a 
variety of funding channels. As of March 2009, the PBF had disbursed $122 million to 
twelve recipient countries, with 70% of its resources going to the UN Peacebuilding 
Commission’s four “adoptee” countries: Burundi, Central African Republic, Guinea-
Bissau, and Sierra Leone.  PBF is required to disburse its funds through UN agencies, and 
73% of its total allocations have been passed through UNDP. Despite its early recovery 
mandate, PBF resources have often been provided in later stages of war-to-peace 
transitions. 
 
Established with the goals of financing urgent but underfunded peacebuilding activities 
and mobilizing on-going resource flows, the PBF has run into the same constraints that 
characterize much of the international aid architecture: lack of strategic planning and 
prioritization; complex and time-consuming decision-making and disbursement 
procedures; role confusion and coordination failures; unpredictability and uncertain 
sustainability; limited staff capacities; and, stemming from all of these, questionable 
effectiveness in meeting peacebuilding objectives. On top of these generic problems, the 
PBF suffers from having a complicated management structure: it is part of a tripartite 
arrangement with the UN’s Peacebuilding Commission and Peacebuilding Support 
Office, and it is subject to third-party management through UNDP’s Multi-Donor Trust 
Fund office. Ball and van Biejnum (2009) offer a set of recommendations, in part 
developed by internal review, to re-align the Fund’s early and medium-term funding 
windows, set more explicit peacebuilding priorities, and streamline responsibilities and 
procedures to help the PBF fulfill its promise.   
 
 
5. Trends in National Government Finance 
 
This section reviews trends in national government finance in postconflict and fragile 
countries. First we discuss domestic revenue; then we discuss the composition of 
government expenditure. In section 6, we discuss relationships between international 





A critical feature of legitimate and effective states is the social contract between the 
government and the citizenry. The state provides services including physical security, 
economic infrastructure, health care, and education. The public, in turn, pays taxes based 
on the perception that the state will fund these services. In postconflict countries and 
fragile states, this nexus is often weak, and in some parts of a country it may be non-
existent. 
 
Postconflict countries often have a very low ratio of domestic revenue to national income. 
In many cases, they also have a relatively low national-income denominator, with the 
result that their ability to fund public goods and services is exceptionally limited. As 
shown in Figure 8, this pattern is found across regions, even in countries where a number 
of years have elapsed since the onset of peace. In Latin America, the tax coefficient (ratio 
of tax revenue to GDP) in Guatemala and El Salvador in 2007 was roughly two-thirds of 
the regional average. In sub-Saharan Africa, the tax coefficients in Uganda and the DRC 
were 61% and 38% of the regional average, respectively. In South Asia, those in 
Afghanistan and Nepal were 43% and 75% of the regional norm. And in the East Asia & 
Pacific region, the tax coefficients of Cambodia and Timor-Leste (apart from its offshore 




Tax revenue in selected postconflict countries compared to regional averages


































*DRC estimate is for the year 2005. Source: IMF, "Democratic Republic of the Congo: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper," September 2007, Table 12.




The sluggish growth of domestic revenue in postconflict countries reveals a serious 
lacuna in policies intended to promote statebuilding and peacebuilding. In many cases, 
the fiscal dimension is under-emphasized, if not missing altogether, in the postconflict 
policy priorities of national governments and international donors alike. Even in the case 
of Guatemala, where the 1996 peace accords explicitly mandated an increase in tax 
revenues from 8% of national income – the lowest level in the western hemisphere next to 
Haiti – to 12% by the year 2000, progress has been very slow: in 2000, the country’s tax 
coefficient barely reached 10%, and six years later it had yet to reach the 12% target (see 
Figure 9).  
 
Figure 9 
Tax revenue in Guatemala, 1995-2006
















One factor exacerbating the slow revenue growth in postconflict countries has been donor 
support for tariff reductions in the name of trade liberalization and economic efficiency. 
In Guatemala, for example, even as the IMF’s Managing Director publicly endorsed the 
revenue-enhancement goal mandated by the peace accords, the Fund’s staff urged the 
government to cut tariffs.
25 As shown in Figure 9, tariff revenue in Guatemala fell both 
                                                 
25 Visiting Guatemala in May 1997, IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus stated that the Fund’s only 
condition for a stand-by agreement would be that the government complies with its peace-accord 
commitments, including a 50% increase in the revenue-to-GDP ratio. Yet at the 1998 meeting of the 
Consultative Group for Guatemala, the IMF representative urged the government to ‘resist pressures to 
increase import duties or delay the scheduled reduction in customs tariffs,’ arguing that ‘these actions will 
have adverse effects on output growth.’ For discussion, see Boyce (2002, pp. 40-47). 
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relative to total tax revenue and absolutely. Yet tariffs are often a major component of tax 
revenue in low-income countries, among other reasons because the administrative costs 
of collecting customs duties are relatively low. Moreover, the efficiency argument for 
trade liberalization – that domestic industries should not be protected from international 
competitors who can produce at lower cost – is largely irrelevant in contexts where trade-
competing industries do not exist. Guatemala, for example, does not have an automobile 
industry, nor is it likely to have one in the foreseeable future; hence there is no efficiency 
argument against substantial tariffs on Guatemala’s automobile imports, which could 
provide a significant source of tax revenue. 
We return to this topic in section 6, where we consider ways that the international 
community can actively support – rather than obstruct – revenue generation in low-
income countries in general, and in postconflict countries in particular. 
Managing revenues from extractive resources 
 
Extractive industries, such as petroleum and mining, can provide the state with 
substantial revenues to fund public expenditure without taxing its citizens directly. There 
is a risk, however, that this “easy money” will weaken the state-society fiscal contract by 
reducing the government’s accountability to taxpayers, as well as fostering rent-seeking 
behavior and exacerbating social tensions. Whether extractive resources prove to be a 
blessing or a curse is not a foregone conclusion: the results are contingent on policies and 
politics. The establishment of resource-specific revenue instruments, like the Petroleum 
Fund of Timor-Leste (see sidebar), is one recent strategy to address these concerns. 
Another, complementary, strategy would be to set up an extractive sector forum, bringing 
together citizens, political leaders and companies to forge a “resource compact” that 




The other side of the state-society contract is the delivery of services by the state that the 
public expects in return for paying taxes. Expenditure patterns in postconflict countries 
often differ from regional norms, with relatively high levels of military expenditure and 
relatively low levels of expenditure on social services, such as health and education. This 
is illustrated in Figure 10, which compares the ratio of military expenditure to public 
health expenditure in four postconflict states – Burundi, Angola, Cote d’Ivoire, and Sierra 
Leone – to the average ratio in other countries in sub-Saharan Africa. In Sierra Leone, 
military expenditure is nearly 40% higher than public health expenditure, and in Burundi 
it is more than six times higher; in contrast, the regional norm is for public health 








RESOURCE BLESSING?   
The Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund 
 
When Timor-Leste became an independent nation in 2002 it ranked among the 
poorest countries in the world, with an annual per capita income of less than 
US$1/day. With the onset of offshore petroleum production two years later, oil and 
natural gas suddenly became the country’s largest source of national income and 
government revenue.  
 
In an effort to ensure that this new wealth will turn out to be a blessing rather than a 
“resource curse,” the Timorese Parliament established a Petroleum Fund (PF) in 2004, 
modeled on Norway’s, with technical assistance from the IMF. 
 
All petroleum earnings must be deposited into the PF, to be invested in U.S. Treasury 
bills or other sovereign debt instruments. By 2009, the Fund had grown to more than 
US$5 billion. The government can withdraw money from the PF for public 
expenditure, but annual withdrawals are limited to the PF’s “estimated sustainable 
income.” Any withdrawal beyond this limit would require the government to provide 
Parliament with a detailed explanation of why it is in the long-term interests of the 
country, along with a report certified by the PF’s independent auditor on the impact 
on future sustainable income.  
 
The PF aims: 
 
•  to preserve the value of the country’s petroleum wealth for future generations; 
•  to limit the risk of “Dutch disease” from exchange-rate appreciation; 
•  to insulate the national budget from the impact of oil price instability; and 
•  to ensure transparency in the use of petroleum revenues. 
 
Transparency is important for statebuilding as well as for economic reasons. An IMF 
report (2009, p. 5) remarks that the PF aims at “avoiding that rent seeking leads to 
economic and social divisions and weakened institutions.” The IMF (p. 13) cautions, 
however, that “transparency helps, but easy access to petroleum revenue still alters the 




These differences are not surprising, but they suggest a need for careful attention to the 
composition of government expenditure in light of the requirements of statebuilding and 
peacebuilding. Postconflict countries often inherit relatively large military forces; 
expenditures associated with postwar disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration 
(DDR) may continue to lead to larger-than-normal military budgets and yet be fully 
consistent with peace implementation goals. Moreover, in some cases ongoing security 
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challenges may provide a rationale for above-average military expenditures. But the 
political influence of the military may also play a role, independent of security needs that 
carry legitimacy in the eyes of the wider public. In the immediate postwar years in El 
Salvador, for example, military spending remained three times higher as a percentage of 
GDP than it had been before the war; meanwhile inadequate funding for new democratic 
institutions, including the National Civilian Police, threatened to undermine the peace 
implementation process.
26 In such cases, the goals of building an effective and legitimate 
state and securing a durable peace require reallocations of expenditure in accord with 
these priorities.  
 
Figure 10 














6. International Assistance and National Finance 
 
This section considers how the provision of external resources affects national finance in 
postconflict countries and fragile states. First, we consider the relation between inflows of 
international assistance and the national tax effort. We then discuss several policies by 
which the international community could strengthen the contribution of aid to building 
sustainable fiscal systems. Lastly, we examine the impediments to building effective and 
legitimate states posed by external debt legacies.  
 
                                                 
26 For discussion, see De Soto and Castillo (1994) and Boyce (1996, Chapters 5‐7). 
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The issues discussed in this section are relevant to aid in general; they are not entirely 
unique to postconflict countries and fragile states. But in these countries, where the fiscal 
dimension of statebuilding is (or ought to be) a high priority, these issues stand out in 
particularly sharp relief. Elsewhere the relationship between international assistance and 
national finance may be dismissed as a matter of less-than-critical importance, but in 
postconflict countries and fragile states it cannot. 
 
Aid and tax revenue 
 
In principle, international financing can help in building, or repairing, the state-society 
contract that ties taxation to the provision of public goods and services. Aid can be used 
to increase government expenditures beyond what domestic revenue would otherwise 
allow, and if this builds public confidence in the willingness and ability of the state to 
provide desired goods and services this can, in turn, help to build support for increased 
taxation. 
 
In practice, however, this effect is not a foregone conclusion. By providing a soft option 
for recipient states to obtain revenue – compared to the harder route of collecting taxes – 
aid may “crowd out” domestic revenue mobilization rather than promoting it. There is no 
a priori reason to assume that one effect always will prevail over the other (see Figure 
11). More importantly, there is scope for donor policy decisions to influence the direction 















Figure 12a shows the relationship between aid and tax revenue (as percentages of GDP) 
in the low and lower-middle income countries of sub-Saharan Africa in 2006-08. Two 
observations can be made on these data. First, there is some evidence of an inverse 
relationship between the two variables – a constant-elasticity estimate of the relationship 
indicates that a 10% increase in aid is associated with a 2.4% reduction in taxes
27– but 
this relationship is primarily attributable to two outliers, Lesotho (with relatively low aid 
and high tax revenues) and Sierra Leone (with relatively high aid and low tax revenues). 
Second, among the other countries there is no indication that higher aid is associated with 
higher tax revenues. 
 
Figure 12a 
Aid and Taxes: 
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* Sierra Leone data refer to 2004-2006.
  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations, using WDI data. 
 
                                                 
27 The estimating equation: ln(taxes) = 3.003 - 0.239ln(aid). 
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Cross-sectional correlations cannot prove causation, of course. In the case of a negative 
correlation, higher aid could lead to lower taxes, or lower taxes could lead to higher aid, 
or both could be affected by other variables, or some combination of these could be at 
work. But we can say that the absence of a positive correlation between aid and taxes 
suggests that aid may not be doing much to improve tax revenues. 
 
Econometric studies that have sought to identify causal relationships in the effect of aid 
on tax revenues have not settled this issue, but many researchers have found negative or 
insignificant impacts. In a review of evidence from sub-Saharan Africa, Moss, Pettersson 
and van de Valle (2006) conclude that aid “may have undercut incentives for revenue 
collection.” To illustrate, they note that a scattergram showing aid and tax shares in low 
and lower-middle income countries in the 28-year period from 1972 to 1999 (reproduced 
here as Figure 12b), the top right quadrant (high aid and high taxes) is empty. They also 
conclude that aid has adversely affected the quality of governance: “states which can 
raise a substantial portion of their revenues from the international community are less 





Source: Moss, Pettersson and van de Walle (2006, p. 12). 
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An IMF study of 107 recipient countries found that the effects of grant aid differed from 
those of loans. Grants had a negative impact on domestic revenues, an effect that was 
strongest in countries plagued by “high levels of corruption” where “the decline in 
revenues completely offsets the increase in grants” (Gupta et al. 2003). Concessional 
loans were associated with higher domestic revenue mobilization, an effect the authors 
suggest may be due to the need to raise revenue to repay the loans. From the standpoint 
of assisting in building the state-society contract, however, increasing revenue for the 
purpose of servicing debt to external creditors is a less than resounding success, for it 
fails to uphold the state’s side of the state-society contract: the delivery of services to its 
citizenry. 
 
Can Aid Crowd in Fiscal Capacity? 
 
There are several ways that aid donor policies could seek to “crowd in” greater fiscal 
capacity – the capacity of states to raise revenue, allocate resources, and manage 
expenditure – in recipient countries. These include: 
 
•  Technical assistance: Donors can – and, to a limited extent, do – provide 
assistance in the area of tax policy and administration. The amounts are generally 
small, however: the OECD (2009a, p. 95) reports that in 2006 only 0.087% of 
official development assistance was dedicated to “tax-related tasks,” and that only 
one-eighth of this ($11 million worldwide) went to fragile and conflict-affected 
countries, primarily Afghanistan, Rwanda, and Kenya.  
 
•  Budget support: Channeling aid through the national budget could not only build 
government capacity to allocate and manage expenditure but also strengthen 
public confidence in the ability of the government to deliver goods and services, 
thus enhancing their willingness to pay taxes. Yet at present, only a small fraction 
of aid is allocated to budget support. Aid agencies have a fiduciary responsibility 
to see that their money is well spent, but this can be met by “dual control” 
systems that seek to ensure accountability and transparency. Such a system has 
been implemented by the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), 
discussed in section 4: recurrent budget expenditures are submitted to the ARTF 
for reimbursement, which is disbursed after review by an external monitoring 
agent whose function is akin to that of an internal auditor.
28 
 
•  Revenue conditionality: Donors could (but rarely do) make access to aid 
conditional upon progress in domestic revenue mobilization, a policy that would 
be akin to the provision of matching grants by philanthropic foundations. DfID’s 
former chief economist has proposed that donors collectively limit aid to 50% of 
the tax revenue collected by the recipient government, excluding oil and mineral 
revenues (Wood 2008). Among the low and lower-middle income countries of 
sub-Saharan Africa, this ceiling would require aid reductions (and/or tax 
increases) in the countries in the red half of the scattergram in Figure 12a. A 
                                                 
28 For more on the ARTF, see Ghani et al. (2007) and Peace Dividend Trust (2009). 
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“matching funds” approach could be facilitated if inter-donor coordination were 
enhanced by channeling more medium-to-long term aid commitments through 
multi-donor trust funds (FIAS 2009, p. 27). Alternatively, revenue conditionality 
could be applied by individual donors to a subset of total aid.
29 For example, 
budget support in Afghanistan through the ARTF now includes an incremental 
amount tied to revenue performance in addition to a gradually declining base 
level. 
 
•  Taxing aid: Currently, not only aid itself but also aid-generated income flows are 
largely tax-exempt in the recipient countries. This deprives governments of 
needed revenues, impedes learning-by-doing in tax administration, and, above all, 
sends a perverse message to the populace: powerful people do not trust the 
government with their money and do not pay taxes. Efforts to tax aid – including 
tariffs on aid-financed imports, taxes on the incomes of national and expatriate aid 
agency employees and private contractors, and taxes on rental incomes of the 
owners of housing and offices leased to aid agencies and their staff – could help 
to prime the pump of domestic tax collection. This would require substantial, and 
in our view quite sensible, changes in current aid protocols.
30  
 
•  Local procurement: It is estimated that only one of every ten dollars spent by the 
UN Transitional Administration in East Timor ‘actually reached the East 
Timorese’ (Chesterman 2004, p. 183).
31 Local procurement can help to spur 
economic recovery and development (see sidebar on “spending the development 
dollar twice” in Afghanistan).
32 In so doing, it can also help to expand the 
country’s tax base, particularly if procurement policies are tied where appropriate 
to tax compliance by local firms. Channeling a larger share of donor expenditure 
into local economies will require measures beyond the formal “untying” of aid 
envisioned in the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (Clay, Geddes and 
Natali 2009): it will require preferential policies to favor local procurement. Even 
when local procurement would entail higher transaction costs (or other costs), 
such policies cannot be dismissed as “inefficient” once we recognize that what is 
being procured is not only a given volume of goods and services, but also positive 
externalities created in their provision. 
                                                 
29 Revenue conditionality also has been proposed in a study by the IMF Fiscal Affairs Department (Gupta 
et al. 2003, p. 18): “Traditionally, donors have imposed conditions on the expenditure side on how their 
resources could be utilized, without taking into account the impact of assistance on revenues… A similar 
type of requirement could be considered for the revenue side.”  
30 For further discussion, see Boyce and O’Donnell (2007); Carnahan (2007); and OECD (2010a, pp. 105-
107). 
 
31 Chesterman (2004, pp. 183-4) gives this telling example: “At one point, $27 million was spent annually 
on bottled water for the international staff – approximately half the budget of the embryonic Timorese 
government, and money that might have paid for water purification plants to serve both international staff 
and locals well beyond the life of the mission.”  
32 Peace Dividend Trust (2009).  See also Carnahan, Durch and Gilmore (2006).  
   38 SPENDING THE DEVELOPMENT DOLLAR TWICE: 
Local Procurement in Afghanistan 
 
The Afghan Compact, signed by more than 60 nations in early 2006, committed aid 
donors to increasing the share of assistance channeled through the government budget 
and increasing local procurement of goods and services. A study of ODA 
disbursements by the Peace Dividend Trust (2009) found that in the following year 
approximately 38% of donor spending entered the Afghan economy.   
 
“Using local goods and services to carry out project work,” the study observes (p. 30), 
“allows a development dollar to be spent twice – providing much-needed goods and 
services to Afghan citizens and communities while simultaneously creating jobs, 
generating revenue, and promoting a more sustainable marketplace – all of which can 
ultimately reduce the likelihood of a relapse into conflict.”  
 
Among the eight large ODA donors surveyed by PDT researchers, the share of local 
content in their spending ranged from 23% (in the case of the United States) to 71% 
(in the case of the United Kingdom). 
 
The study found that 70-80% of aid channeled to the government in direct budget 
support or through multi-donor trust funds went into the local economy, compared to 
10-20% of aid disbursed via contracts with international companies and international 
NGOs for construction, technical assistance, service delivery, and the supply of 
specific goods. Smaller amounts of ODA were disbursed through contracts with local 
providers, mostly for construction and rehabilitation of buildings and other 
infrastructure; in these cases, local content was found to be 35-50%, since many 
inputs were imported. 
 
Three main recommendations emerged from this analysis: 
 
•  First, donors should increase the share of aid channeled into budget support 
and trust funds, so as to increase spillover benefits to the local economy. 
 
•  Second, donors should make efforts to increase local procurement, among 
other ways by translating tenders into local languages, supporting seminars for 
local small and medium enterprises on procurement procedures, and educating 
international staff on the economic benefits of local spending. 
 
•  Finally, donors should monitor and collect systematic data on the share of 
local procurement in their aid disbursements. 
 
•  Support for civil society capacity to demand transparency and accountability: Aid 
donors can seek to strengthen the society side of the state-society fiscal contract, 
too. In particular, efforts to promote transparency and accountability can work 
from the demand side as well as the supply side. The public expenditure 
monitoring by civil society organizations in Uganda’s Poverty Action Fund, 
mentioned earlier, is an example. Ugandan civil society groups have received 
support for this work from ODA donors, including DANIDA and DfID, as well as 
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from private agencies such as OXFAM (de Renzio et al. 2006). Similar initiatives 
have been launched in other countries, including Croatia and South Africa 
(Robinson 2006). To date, however, support for such efforts has been the 
exception rather than the rule.  
 
 
Postconflict debt burdens 
 
Many postconflict countries face high external debt burdens. These debts are often a 
legacy, at least in part, of borrowing that fed into social tensions that precipitated the 
conflict and of borrowing that was used to finance military expenditure during the 
conflict. Figure 13 illustrates this pattern in sub-Saharan African countries: in Liberia, 
Guinea-Bissau, Burundi and the DRC, the ratio of external debt to GDP in 2007 exceeded 
1.0, compared to an average of 0.4 in other countries in the region. 
 
Figure 13 


























As a result, postconflict countries often are obliged to devote a substantial share of scarce 
government resources to the payment of debt service. As shown in Figure 14, in 2006 
debt-service payments were seven times greater than public health expenditure in 
Guinea-Bissau, more than five times greater in Burundi, and more than four times greater 
in Angola. In the average sub-Saharan African country, the ratio was considerably lower 
although debt service still exceeded public health expenditures. Along with its human 
cost, the diversion of African government resources into debt service may impose a 



















One way that donors can ease debt burdens is by offering debt relief. Some relief has 
been provided by bilateral creditors. The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) 
initiative has provided some temporary and provisional relief for countries that have 
passed its “decision point,” but relatively few countries have reached the “completion 
point” at which time debt relief becomes irrevocable. At present, debt burdens in many 
countries remain high as shown Figures 13 and 14.  
 
Moreover, the conditions countries are required to meet to qualify for debt relief may be 
problematic, if not simply infeasible, in the wake of violent conflict. Announcing an 
emergency postconflict loan to the Central African Republic in 2004, for example, a 
senior IMF official remarked:  “It will be important to resist political pressures to 
increase spending ahead of the elections, and to sustain and deepen the effort to contain 
the wage bill, given the large share of public expenditure absorbed by salary 
payments.”
33 Noting the singular importance during postconflict transitions of efforts “to
improve the well-being of public servants and other groups that need to feel part o
peace process,” del Castillo (2008, p. 71) comments that such business-as-usual demands 





                                                
 
 
33 “IMF Approves US$8.2 million Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance for the Central African Republic,” 
IMF Press Release No. 04/158, July 23, 2004. 
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Another potential way to ease debt burdens is by the selective erasure of “odious” debts, 
defined as debts contracted for purposes that did not benefit the people of the country, 
without their consent, in situations where creditors knew or should have known that this 
was the case. The establishment of an international arbitration body where claims of 
odious debt could be adjudicated at low cost – a step proposed by the government of 






This review of financing for fragile and conflict-affected states has revealed a variety of 
weaknesses in current arrangements. The performance and eligibility criteria that have 
been introduced for much of ODA are not well-suited to addressing the challenges posed 
by weak state-society relationships and the risk of violent conflict. The large number of 
bilateral and multilateral donors provides diversity of funding sources but impedes policy 
coordination and strategy coherence, while placing substantial burdens on recipient 
countries with limited administrative and managerial capacity. Multi-donor trust funds 
and other forms of pooled funding have in some instances resulted in greater 
collaboration among donors and recipients, but lack of agreement on strategic goals and 
competition among donors with diverse national and institutional interests continue to 
impede coordination and progress on the ground. International assistance, conditioned by 
donors’ postcolonial and strategic interests, is characterized by an uneven distribution of 
resources across countries and regions. Short-term mandates, a paucity of multi-year 
funding, volatility in aid flows and delays in disbursements impede both planning and 
timely implementation. 
 
The lack of credible and consistent data on aid flows impedes systematic analysis, 
evaluation, and learning, especially in fragile and conflict states where studies are forced 
to rely on incomplete and anecdotal evidence. Despite on-going attempts to improve data 
collection and recording, it remains difficult to track the gaps between pledges, 
commitments and disbursement of aid, and impossible to document its final resting place, 
whether in the administrative bureaucracies of funders or recipients, external service 
providers and consultants, or actual program deliverables on the ground. OECD 
recording codes are not universally agreed, nor are non-eligible ODA activities 
systematically recorded. At present, neither donors nor recipients have anything close to 
an adequate idea of how aid monies are being spent, let alone the impacts of this 
spending on peacebuilding and statebuilding. 
 
All too often, funding is geared to priorities other than strengthening the state-society 
contract and building durable peace. Donors often target projects that provide banner 
visibility and reflect the perceived interests of constituents in donor countries rather than 
pressing postconflict needs that build confidence in recipient countries. Off-the-shelf 
“templates” for postconflict reconstruction substitute for the hard work of designing 
projects around local political, economic, environmental and socio-cultural needs. 
                                                 
34 For discussion, see Ndikumana and Boyce (2010). 
   42
Substantial amounts of international aid fail to touch ground in the recipient countries, 
instead paying for foreign consultants and the administrative costs of the international 
presence. External funds can crowd out incentives for domestic revenue generation, 
deferring steps toward national self-sufficiency and fiscal sustainability. Most aid 
bypasses the government budget, failing to build capacity in resource allocation, public 
expenditure management, and transparent and accountable governance. The international 
presence itself creates fleeting and detached economic enclaves that fail to provide the 
building blocks for local enterprise, leaving the national economy on the sidelines in 




With this daunting constellation of problems in mind, we offer the following 
recommendations: 
 
•  Create an international, comprehensive database on aid to fragile and conflict 
states in order to facilitate monitoring, evaluation and accountability for 
both donors and recipients. 
•  Create national-level databases on aid commitments and actual and planned 
disbursements, including mechanisms (e.g., direct budget support, service 
delivery through NGOs, etc.) and sectoral allocations, a step that would 
require that donors track this information internally and share it. 
•  Develop criteria for international funding for fragile and conflict-affected states 
that do not meet generic performance criteria. 
•  Strengthen aid for conflict prevention, not only by devoting more resources to 
preventive action but also by mainstreaming conflict impact assessment in 
aid programming and project appraisal in fragile states. 
•  Strengthen the capacity of regional and sub-regional organizations and 
development banks to address the regional causes and effects of conflict 
and seek programmatic solutions. 
•  Capitalize multilateral funding mechanisms that can accommodate “aid orphans” 
– including both countries and sectors within countries – independent of 
donor interests and priorities. 
•  Establish a “stand-by” window for rapid needs assessment, deployment of 
personnel and disbursement of funds to meet immediate stabilization and 
conflict-recovery needs beyond humanitarian relief. 
•  Provide funding, including budget support, nationally to support locally 
determined plans for recovery and stabilization and help build public 
confidence in the state’s capacity to fulfill the social contract. 
•  Structure aid in ways that develop national public finance and management 
capacity with attention to fiduciary responsibility and accountability, 
including through civil society watchdog mechanisms. 
•  Explore ways to bring aid and the associated income flows into the tax base of 
recipient countries – so as to increase domestic revenue, build revenue-
collection capacities, and affirm the principles of good fiscal governance – 
an effort that could begin with clarification of what is now taxable and non-
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taxable so as to eliminate blurred lines that currently leave much scope for 
tax evasion. 
•  Design and implement procurement policies that favor – or, at a minimum, do not 
exclude – local contractors, service providers, and labor, with an eye to 
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